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Abstract: Often, in the original scientific writings, a double negated statement 
(DNS) is not equivalent to his corresponding positive one; that means the in-
ferring law ¬¬A ® A does not apply. Recent studies recognized in the failure 
of  this  logical  law  the  borderline  between  classical  and non-classical logics. 
Original writings by classical chemists dealing with the problem of atomism 
are particularly characterized by the occurrences of DNSs. An historical case, 
Avogadro’s  contribution  to  atomism  (i.e.  the well-known hypothesis about 
the constitution of gases), is here analyzed in such terms. It turns out that, in 
order to support his ideas, Avogadro suggested several ad absurdum proofs, 
indeed a way of reasoning typically linked to the use of DNSs.  
Keywords: atomism, logic, Avogadro 
Introduction 
More  than  a  century  ago,  classical  logic  was  formalized  in  mathematical 
terms. Next, some ‘deviant’ mathematical logics were born whose status was 
for a long time dubious. Finally, some decades ago mathematical logic was 
recognized not to be unique, as generally believed. At a formal level what dis-
criminates the classical logic from the non-classical ones (say absolute, posi-
tive, minimal and intuitionistic logics), is the axiom ¬¬A ® A (read: ‘not-
not-A implies A’, where A is any statement), which holds true for classical 
logic, whilst it fails for non-classical ones.1 In other words, the basic differ-
ence between classical and non-classical logics may be confined to the law of 
double negation: if classical logic applies, a double negated sentence implies 
its related positive, otherwise we have what we call a DNS, i.e. a double ne-
gated sentence, which (and that is the fundamental point) is not equivalent to 
the related positive one. 
  By an historical investigation one may recognize the theoretical origin of 
these DNSs in Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason; even the sentence of 
this principle is a DNS: “… rien n’est sans raison, ou que toute vérité a sa 44  Antonino Drago & Romina Oliva 
preuve a priori tirée de la notions des termes, quoyqu’il ne soit pas toujours 
en notre pouvoir de parvenir à cette analyse”;2 where Leibniz first states the 
principle as a ¬¬A, then he tries to draw the corresponding A, yet he has to 
recognize it as impossible in most cases.  
  The failure of the double negation law (¬¬A ® A) may be plainly ex-
pressed by the use of double negation of a single statement, really a common 
linguistic scheme – ‘litote’ – expressing the thought of a layman; whereas, for 
instance,  the  failure  of  the  excluded  middle  law  –  in  formal  terms  AÚØA 
(read: A or not A) – has to be deliberately emphasized by an author through 
an explicit argument. Thus, the occurrence of such DNSs in a scientific text 
may point out that the writer is not applying the double negation law since he 
is arguing by a non-classical logic. A linguistic analysis of the original writings 
of a scientist can reveal his style of argumentation different from classical log-
ic. Of course, we do not claim that people deliberately argued by means of a 
non-classical  logic  before  it  was  recognized  and  properly  formalized.  No 
doubt each of these scientists overtly committed himself to classical logic (it 
was simply ‘the logic’ for what was manageable by the scientific reason of the 
time, i.e. syllogistic and later propositional sentences). Rather we suggest that 
in the past some scientists were inclined by some uncommon situations – we 
will define in the following – to search for new ways of argumentation, and 
therefore they made an ante litteram use of non-classical logic.  
  Our investigation of ways of reasoning begins with the linguistic analysis 
of writings in order to mark all recurring DNSs. Here we apply this research 
method to writings pertaining to ‘hard’ sciences. (All double negated sen-
tences we will report in the following are DNSs, i.e. double negated sentences 
not reducible to the related positive ones.) In science a DNS generally points 
out a problem; i.e., there is no sufficient experimental evidence to assert A, 
while, on the other hand, there is some direct and/or indirect evidences – of-
ten an ad absurdum argument3 –, that ‘it is not possible that A is not true’. At 
the same time a DNS offers a methodological principle saying that the subse-
quent theory should not contain the assertion A; for instance, the impossibil-
ity of a motion without an end prevents the theory from stating a perpetual 
motion. 
  In the following, we begin by listing some instances of DNSs in science. 
Then we will focus our attention upon chemistry, in particular on the texts 
pertaining to the early historical phase of chemical atomism, which was de-
veloped in the first half of 19th century. Finally, we analyze in detail the case 
of Amedeo Avogadro, in order to get a deeper insight in the way he first 
formulated the well-known hypothesis about the constitution of gases; actu-
ally he made use of several DNSs and ad absurdum proofs. As a result, we 
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1. Double negated statements in science 
In several scientific theories one may find many instances of DNSs in the 
books written by the respective founders of these theories. For the sake of 
brevity, we quote some instances only. 
  In mathematics an example is in L. Carnot’s writing which re-founds in-
finitesimal analysis in an operative way: “The infinitesimals are not chimerical 
(=not not real) beings”.4 While there is no direct evidence for the existence 
of infinitesimals, there is evidence for the absurdity of not-existence. A more 
striking example is offered by N.I. Lobachevski when he discovered non-
Euclidean  geometry:  “1°  Rien  ne  s’oppose  à  admettre  que  la  somme  des 
angles d’un triangle rectiligne soit moindre que deux angles droits”.5 
  In physics many authors of mechanics, thermodynamics and electricity 
stressed the same basic principle, first announced by Stevin in the following 
way: “A motion without an end [commonly said a perpetuum mobile] is ab-
surd”.6 Since the ignorance of friction during the motion does not allow to 
determine the final time of the motion, one cannot strictly infer the corre-
sponding sentence: “Any motion has an end”. In mechanics, L. Carnot’s iner-
tia statement is the following one: “Once a body is put at rest, it cannot move 
by itself [= without other bodies]; once it is in motion, it can change by it-
self neither its direction nor its velocity”.7 Let us remark that Newton had 
stated the same idea as an abstract principle, by saying that a body “perse-
veres” (or “continues”) its motion, i.e. by making use of an idealistic concept 
just in order to change a DNS into an alternative form. In L. Carnot’s me-
chanics the main idea is the following one: “Il y a donc […] dans toute per-
cussion ou communication de mouvement […] une quantité qui n’est point 
altérée par le choc”;8 i.e. an invariant (= something not unequal) of the mo-
tion; which does not mean at all something equal to itself. In thermodynam-
ics Joule concluded his experiments by the statement: “It is patently absurd 
to guess that forces God gave to matter may be destroyed by man’s action 
[…] or even created”;9 that constitutes a new linguistic way to state a conser-
vation law by means of DNS. In thermodynamics, again, the main problem is 
the “equivalence of heat and work”. That does not means at all that heat is 
(equal to) work, because we know that only part of the heat can be converted 
into work (an engine capable to convert all heat into work cannot exist). On 
the other hand, “heat is not work” is a false statement. Rather “it is not true 
that heat is not work” turns out to be the appropriate sentence.10 
  In the 1930s, as well known, Birkhoff and von Neumann found out quan-
tum mechanics to follow a non-classical logic.11 From physical evidence12 the 
distributive law was taken by Birkhoff and von Neumann as the borderline 
between quantum logic and classical logic. However some following scholars 
axiomatized quantum logic by putting just the law of double negation to play 
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cases of scientific theories relying upon a non-classical logic. Moreover, this 
discovery proves that non-classical logic is not a side effect of just linguistic 
relevance in scientific theories, but it pertains to the core of the most ad-
vanced physical theories of the present century. It is clear why the discovery 
of non-classical logic in a physical theory by Birkhoff and von Neumann was 
not bypassed by physicists following classical logic: they indeed recognized 
the relevance of non-classical logic, since for the first time a DNS concerns 
the definition of a state of the system at issue. (Neither it can be confined to 
play a lateral role, outside the principles of the theory, nor can it be obscured 
by translating it by means of a misleading concept). On the contrary, in phys-
ical theories of the past DNSs concern statements that may be put aside when 
referring to the formal state of the system at issue. In chemistry the theory is 
expressed in linguistic terms, thus the DNSs may appear as a linguistic phe-
nomenon only, not affecting the theoretical argumentation. However, we will 
show that, in the celebrated case of Avogadro’s hypothesis, DNSs played a 
crucial role in the scientist’s theoretical reasoning.  
2. Double negated statements in the scientific tradition 
of chemistry 
When scrutinizing chemical literature, we notice a common feature of the 
writings by even the early atomistic chemists; they state any crucial statement 
about atomism, for which they could not provide direct experimental evi-
dence, as a double negated statement ¬¬A, i.e. “it is not true that it is not 
[…]”, or an equivalent version.  
  In fact, beyond reference to entities like air, water, earth, and fire, there 
was a great problem just at the starting point of their thinking, i.e. whether 
matter is divisible infinitely or not. It was a tenet of most of them that: “A 
mathematical divisibility ad infinitum does not apply to the matter of which 
the world is made”.14 The statement A: “A mathematical division ad finitum 
applies to matter” did not hold true during a long time, in which no one 
could decide by experimental means at which finite extent matter is divisible. 
In the lack of direct experimental evidence, chemists’ dominant attitude was 
to take as a principle ¬¬A. 
  Let us list some statements, whose dates range since the early times of 
such a theory. By starting his well-known dialogue Boyle suggests some basic 
statements; three out of four statements are double negated ones: “It not 
seems absurd […]”; “It is not even impossible […]”; “I will not deny per-
emptorily […]”.15   Atomism and the Reasoning by a Non-Classical Logic  47 
  Lavoisier suggested a new method for chemical research. This method re-
lied upon certain experimental rules about the weights of substances involved 
in a chemical reaction. As a result, the subsequent chemists knew well the 
distinction between assertions provable by experimental means and merely 
hypothetical assertions. As Lavoisier stressed: “J’espère que le lecteur voudra 
bien ne pas confondre ce que je donne pour des vérités de fait et d’expérience 
avec ce qui n’est encore qu’hypothétique”.16 Proust reiterates the same theme: 
“[…] to admit nothing provisionally, or beyond that which the facts set forth 
at present”.17  
  However, the chemists following Lavoisier’s method had to refer to the 
notion of elements, although they were aware of the lack of facts supporting 
their existence. Until the present century (let us recall Rutherford’s a-beams 
and ultra-microscope), no experimental evidence for the existence of atoms 
had been provided. For this reason, when writing about the main problem of 
chemistry, Dalton says: “By elementary principles, or simple bodies, we mean 
such as have not been decomposed, but are found to enter into combination 
with other bodies. We do not know [by experimental means] that anyone of 
the  bodies  denominated  elementary,  is  absolutely  in-decomposable,  but  it 
ought to be called simple, till it can be analyzed.”18 Here the word ‘simple’ 
stands for A in correspondence to the word ‘in-decomposable’, which stands 
for ¬¬A. Indeed, if chemical atomism was just the research for the ultimate 
components of matter to be considered in chemical combinations, then in the 
early writings of atomistic chemists the word ‘decomposable’ naturally carries 
a negative meaning in the sense of ‘not-ultimate’ or ‘not-simple’.  
  Dalton’s reasoning by means of a double negated statement was the same 
as Lavoisier’s on the same subject. Indeed, in defining the notion of elements 
twenty  years  earlier,  Lavoisier  writes:  “Si  […]  nous  attachons  au  nom 
d’éléments  ou  principes  des  corps  l’idée  du  dernier  terme  auquel  parvient 
l’analyse, toutes les substances que nous n’aurons pu décomposer par aucun 
moyen  sont,  pour  nous,  des  éléments”.19  The  first  statement  (“Si  […] 
l’analyse”) expresses a definition as a speculative idea, by means of exactly the 
positive statement A of the double negated statement ¬¬A by which the 
quotation ends. Actually, he puts ¬¬A as a principle. Moreover, Lavoisier 
reports his most remarkable discovery in the following way: “Il est impos-
sible douter de la composition et décomposition de l’eau”.20 
  Some decades later, Wollaston writes: “[…] if it can be ascertained that 
any one body consists of particles no longer divisible, we then scarcely doubt 
that all other bodies are similarly consisted; and we may without hesitation 
conclude that those equivalent quantities, which we have learned to appreci-
ate by proportionate numbers, do really express the relative weights of ele-
mentary atoms”.21 48  Antonino Drago & Romina Oliva 
  The method of the subsequent chemists was fashioned by another of La-
voisier’s statements: “Rien est créé, [nothing is not conserved] […] et un 
principe possible c’est que dans chaque opération la quantité de matière avant 
et après l’opération est la même”.22 Here the ¬¬A is stated first and then, as 
an improper derivation, A is drawn. The derivation is an improper one be-
cause there is not enough experimental evidence for stating A; being aware of 
that, Lavoisier correctly qualifies the statement as a “possible” principle. 
  The way of arguing by means of DNSs became common among chemists; 
also, those who opposed the existence of atoms expressed their opinions by 
multiple negated statements. Kekulé wrote: “I do not hesitate in saying that, 
from a philosophical point of view, I do not believe in the actual existence of 
a-toms, taking the word in its literal signification of in-divisible particles”.23 
3. An historical case study: Amedeo Avogadro’s hy-
pothesis 
The analysis of a specific case will show how such a way of reasoning can 
provide a methodological approach to some basic problems of science and, 
moreover, how much this approach was rooted in the minds of chemists.  
  Let us consider the first formulation of Amedeo Avogadro’s well-known 
hypothesis. The hypothesis consists of two parts: the former one states the 
correspondence between gaseous volumes and the numbers of molecules, the 
latter one suggests the division of molecules in chemical reactions among gas-
es. 
  Avogadro  manifests  these  ideas  for  the  first  time  in  the  Essay  d’une 
manière de determiner les masses relatives … (1811).24 In the following a de-
tailed analysis of the first two sections out of the eight ones constituting the 
whole Essay is presented.25 
Essay: Section I 
In the beginning of the Essay, Avogadro recalls that in 1809 Gay-Lussac had 
showed “que les combinaisons des gaz entre eux se font toujours selon des 
rapports très-simples en volume, et que lorsque le résultat de la combinaison 
est  gazeux,  son  volume est aussi en rapport très-simples avec celui de ses 
composans”. 
  Avogadro’s aim is to give an account for these facts, by translating macro-
scopic objective data into hypotheses on the microscopic world. Because of 
the  hypothetical  nature  and  the  lack  of  direct  experimental  evidence,  he 
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des quantités de substances dans les combinaisons ne paroissent26 pouvoir dé-
pendre que du nombre relatif des molécules qui se combinent, et de celui des 
molécules composées qui en résultent. Il faut donc admettre qu’il y a aussi 
des  rapports  très-simples  entre  les  volumes  des  substances  gazeuses,  et  le 
nombre des molécules simples ou composées qui les forme.” 
  Afterwards, he sketches the first section of his hypothesis: “L’hypothèse 
qui se présent la première à cet égard, et qui paroît même la seule admissible, 
est de supposer que le nombre des molécules intégrantes dans les gaz quel-
conques, est toujours le même à volume égal, ou est toujours proportionnel 
aux volumes.” 
  Avogadro is aware of the speculative nature of his guess; therefore, he of-
fers logical evidence by means of an ad absurdum proof. Indeed, from the op-
posite assumption, i.e. that “le nombre des molécules contenues dans un vo-
lume donné fût différent pour le différens gaz”, he draws a conclusion which 
is unacceptable, since it would prevent us from stating any connection be-
tween microscopic models and macroscopic experimental data: “il ne seroit 
guère possible de concevoir que la loi qui présideroit à la distance des molé-
cules pût donner, en tout cas, des rapports aussi simples que les faits que nous 
venons de citer, nous obligent à admettre entre le volume et le nombre des 
molécules”. As a matter of fact, he is following the methodological principle: 
it is impossible that the combining ratios among macroscopic bodies are not 
determined by the molecular ratios. 
  Let  us  note  that  Avogadro,  in  shaping  his  hypothesis,  refers  to  Gay-
Lussac’s  experimental  results  only,  without  using  any  physical  hypothesis 
about the constitution of matter. After recognizing a relationship between 
gaseous volumes and the numbers of molecules, he has to qualify it by sug-
gesting how molecules interact. To this end, Avogadro presents a physical 
model  connecting  molecules  to  his  caloric  theory.27  His  statements,  being 
DNSs, show that the model is but a heuristic one. He says that any substance 
in the gaseous state, i.e. in the rarefied matter, attracts caloric in a specific 
way, but “sans que l’atmosphère [of caloric] formée par ce fluide ait plus 
d’étendue pour les unes que pour les autres [he does not say: ‘it is equal for 
any substance’], et par conséquent, sans que la distance entre les molécules 
varie [not: ‘the distance is the same’], ou, en d’autres termes, sans que le 
nombre des molécules contenues dans un volume donné soit lui-même diffé-
rent [not: ‘molecules number … is the same’]”.  
  He reports that Dalton maintains just the opposite sentence, i.e. that the 
amount of caloric which is attracted by every different gaseous substance is 
the same, yet it is differently condensed according to the specific affinity of 
each substance. According to Dalton, a variety of distances among molecules 
in different gases should exist. Avogadro disagrees: we are “dans l’ [experi-
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le calorique s’exerce”. Truly, such an ignorance should lead us “à adopter une 
hypothèse mixte, qui feroit varier la distance des molécules et la quantité de 
calorique selon des lois inconnues”. Instead the hypothesis “que nous venons 
de proposer”, i.e. equal volumes of different gases contain the same number 
of molecules, has to be preferred to the previous one, because it is based “sur 
cette simplicité de rapport entre les volumes dans les combinaisons des gaz 
qui  paroît  ne  pouvoir  être  autrement  expliquée”.  Then,  one  page  follows 
where Avogadro tries to apply his ideas to several gaseous substances. 
Essay: Section II 
After the illustration of the correspondence between the volumes of gases 
and numbers of molecules, Avogadro has to give reasons to something more.  
  Let us illustrate the question by means of an example. Gay-Lussac ob-
served that in the reaction of water formation the resulting volumes present 
the following ratios: 2 hydrogen volumes reacting with 1 oxygen volume to 
form 2 (gaseous) water volumes. Remarkably, the product volume of water is 
two times the volume of the reacting oxygen. As Avogadro puts it, such an 
experimental datum, “paroit d’abord s’opposer à l’admission de nôtre hypo-
thèse à l’égard des corps composés […] mais il se présent assez naturellement 
un moyen d’expliquer les faits de ce genre conformément à notre hypothèse”.  
  Indeed, in order to give an account for these data, Avogadro refers just to 
the correspondence between gaseous volumes and the numbers of molecules 
as proposed in the previous section. From both this assumption and Gay-
Lussac’s experimental data, he draws as a logical consequence the second part 
of  his  hypothesis,  i.e.  in  chemical  reactions  the  reacting  molecules  when 
changing into products may divide into parts. In the case of water formation, 
e.g., one oxygen molecule divides up into two “molécules élémentaires”, each 
one forming one water molecule; this hypothesis accounts for the observed 
volume ratios. 
  When illustrating his notion of molecules (i.e. the physical meaning of the 
latter hypothesis) he says they “ne sont pas formées d’une seule molécule 
élémentaire, mais résultent d’un certain nombre de ces molécules réunies en 
une seule par attraction”.27a Avogadro tries to give a positive sentence; howev-
er the result is inaccurate, since no experimental evidence allowed him to de-
fine unambiguously how many “molécules élémentaires” constitute a gaseous 
molecule.] 
  Avogadro proves the second part of his hypothesis by ad absurdum argu-
ments, too. The first proof is: “La possibilité de ce partage des molécules 
composées auroit pu être conjecturé même a priori car sans cela les molécules 
intégrantes des corps composés de plusieurs substances avec des nombres re-
latifs de molécules un peu considérables, deviendroient d’une masse excessive 
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ciple is apparent: it is impossible that the masses of composed bodies are not 
comparable with the masses of simple bodies. 
  However, an a priori argument does not seem to be satisfactory. Hence 
Avogadro adds one more ad absurdum proof: “D’ailleurs une autre considéra-
tions paroît nous obliger d’admettre, dans quelques cas, le partage dont il 
s’agit; car comment pourroiton concevoir sans cela une véritable combinaison 
entre deux corps gazeux qui se réuniroient à volumes égaux, sans qu’il y eût 
condensation ainsi que cela a lieu dans la formation du gaz nitreux?”28 The 
DNS is composed by the word ‘sans’ and by the rhetoric interrogation which 
waiting for a negative answer. 
  “Les molécules restant à la même distance à laquelle l’attraction mutuelle 
des molécules de chacun des deux gaz ne pouvoit s’exercer, on ne pourroit 
supposer qu’une nouvelle attraction eût eu lieu entre les molécules de l’un et 
celles de l’autre; [here, the methodological principle is the following: ‘It is 
impossible that the kind of interaction among gaseous molecules drastically 
changes]; mais dans l’hypothèse [advanced by Avogadro] du partage, on voit 
bien que la combinaison réduit réellement deux molécules différentes à une 
seule, et qu’il y auroit contraction de tout le volume de l’un des gaz, si chaque 
molécule composée ne se divisoit pas en deux molécules de même nature.” 
The last two phrases constitute a further ad absurdum proof: it is impossible 
to explain chemical reactions with the total volume of products being the 
same as that of the reactants, without resorting to a division of the reacting 
molecules. 
  Finally, let us address the question: which is the relation, if it exists, be-
tween DNSs and ad absurdum proofs, both throughout employed by Avoga-
dro? It is clear that ad absurdum proofs constitute an instance of those apa-
gogical or indirect proofs, which have been widely employed in science since 
the time of Euclid, as testified by the lively debate carried on until this centu-
ry by philosophers, logicians, and scientists about the issue (Kant considered 
them  as  a  watershed  between  philosophy  and  mathematics)3.  The  classical 
logical scheme of an ad absurdum proof is the following one:  
(¬A ® B)  ®  (¬B ® ¬¬A) 
If A is the problematic assertion, one starts with its negation (¬A) and tries 
to derive a falsity or a contradiction B. Then one can infer ¬¬A from ¬B. 
Inference  to  A  is  possible  only  through  the  law  of  double  negation 
(¬¬A ® A).29 Thus, in cases where the double negation law does not hold, as 
apparently  in  Avogadro’s  paper,  the  result  of  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  is  a 
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4. Conclusions 
Nowadays is commonly debated whether chemistry is independent of theo-
retical  physics  or  not.  Such  a  debate  often  refers  to  the  deductive-
nomological  method  of  explanation  illustrated  for  classical  physics  by 
Hempel and Oppenheim in 1948.30 According to that method, given both a 
set of natural laws working as axioms – explicans – and the starting condi-
tions, the particular – explicandum – is inferred. Such a method assumes both 
general laws and an inferring method (logical system). However, up to date, 
historians  interested  in  supporting  the  specific  theoretical  role  played  by 
chemistry have pointed out that classical chemistry lacks those general laws,31 
which indeed constitute a typical feature of classical mechanics. It is unfortu-
nate that the whole debate neglects the issue of chemists’ logic, which truly 
makes apparent a more radical difference between the two theories. 
  We  have  shown  that  several  scientific  theories  follow a specific logical 
path, which differs from the fully deductive path of classical mechanics. In 
the texts where these theories are originally formulated DNSs are apparent. 
Let  us  remark  that  in  our  century  non-classical  logic  has  eventually  been 
acknowledged as a respectable one, since not the modest chemistry but the 
prestigious quantum mechanics has been shown to follow it.12  
  Today it is well known that the failure of the logical law ‘¬¬A ® A’ con-
stitutes the crucial difference of non-classical logic from classical logic. Here, 
on the basis of an analysis of original texts, we suggested that classical chem-
istry – as well as some of the theories belonging to physics and mathematics – 
has been shaped by authoritative scientists through a kind of logic which is at 
radical variance with that of the tradition of Newtonian mechanics. Therefore 
in our opinion chemistry radically differs from classical physics (Newtonian 
paradigm), not just because it is not built on general laws – indeed a DNS 
cannot play the usual role of an axiom, since the omission of the double nega-
tion law goes along with the omission of the law of the excluded middle –, as 
already stressed by other authors;32 but essentially because it employs a dif-
ferent method, essentially based upon induction. 
  In particular, Avogadro formulated his hypothesis by means of this meth-
odological approach, which was quite common among chemists; yet in Avo-
gadro’ writings, who was not an experimental chemist but just a speculative 
one, the approach is more apparent and it led him to more articulated argu-
ments than before. Avogadro illustrated his hypothesis – a crucial point in 
the history of chemical atomism – by nothing more than DNSs and ad absur-
dum proofs. He actually made use of a double negated sentence whenever he 
had to express the result of ad absurdum reasoning. One may stress that, as 
chemists had to discover the ‘indivisible particles’ of matter without direct 
experimental evidence and yet they resulted successful when spectroscopy 
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about gases – today dealt by statistical and quantum mechanics –, and he was 
successful as well.  
  As already said, these two features – DNSs and non-classical logic – are 
inherently bound to one another. Together they suggest a specific method of 
organizing a greatly coherent scientific theory, as in the case of chemistry, 
around a problem that is implied by a crucial double negation. This kind of 
organization, which radically differs from the one of classical mechanics, will 
be the subject of a further paper.  
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